Section II (Remarks)

Cancellation of Claims 18-20; addition of New Claims 31-41

Claims 18-20 have been cancelled herein.

New claims 31- 41 have been added herein to claim specific aspects of the invention. No new matter (35 USC §132) has been introduced.

Support for the newly added claims includes the disclosure at page 22, lines 9-22 of the application, it being noted that claims 32-36 contain corresponding recitals to those of claims 25-30 of the application.

Rejections of Claims on Reference Grounds, and Traversal Thereof

In the March 28, 2006 Office Action, the examiner has rejected claims 1-20 and 25-30 on various reference grounds, including:

a rejection of claims 1-2, 4-9, 11-13, 18-20, and 25-30 under 35 USC § 102(b) as anticipated by Stevenson et al. U.S. Patent 3,819,974 (hereafter "Stevenson");

a rejection of claim 3 under 35 USC § 103(a) as unpatentable over Stevenson in view of O'Connor et al. U.S. Patent 5,208,462 (hereafter "O'Connor");

a rejection of claim 10 under 35 USC § 103(a) as unpatentable over Stevenson in view of Nakamura et al. U.S. Patent 5, 578, 839 (hereafter "Nakamura");

a rejection of claims 14-17 under 35 USC § 103(a) as unpatentable over Stevenson in view of Nakamura, Seybold, et al. U.S. Patent 4,845,223 (hereafter "Seybold"); and "Applicant Admitted Prior Art (APA)."

Such rejections are traversed and reconsideration of the patentability of such rejected claims 1-17[1] and 25-30 is requested, based on the following remarks.

The §102 Rejection of Claims 1-2, 4-9, 11-13, 18-20 and 25-30

The requirement for a proper rejection of a claim under 35 U.S.C. §102(b) is set out in MPEP §2131 ("Anticipation - Application of 35 U.S.C. 102(a), (b), and (e)"):

> **"TO ANTICIPATE A CLAIM, THE REFERENCE MUST TEACH EVERY ELEMENT OF THE CLAIM**
>
> ...
>
> "A claim is anticipated only if each and every element as set forth in the claim is found, either expressly or inherently described, in a single prior art reference." *Verdegaal Bros. v. Union Oil Co. of California*, 814 F.2d 628, 631, 2 USPQ2d 1051, 1053 (Fed. Cir. 1987). ... "The identical invention must be shown in as complete detail as is contained in the ... claim." *Richardson v. Suzuki Motor Co.*, 868 F.2d 1226, 1236, 9 USPQ2d 1913, 1920 (Fed. Cir. 1989). The elements must be arranged as required by the claim... *In re Bond*, 910 F.2d 831, 15 USPQ2d 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1990)."

Applying such anticipation criteria to the claims 1-2, 4-9, 11-13 and 25-30 rejected on Stevenson, it is to be noted that Stevenson fails to teach a

> "light emitting assembly comprising a solid state device...arranged to...emit from the solid state device a first, relatively shorter wavelength radiation, and a down-converting luminophoric medium arranged in receiving relationship to said first, relatively shorter wavelength radiation, and which in exposure to said first, relatively shorter wavelength radiation, is excited to responsively emit radiation in the visible white light spectrum,"

as recited in broad claim 1.

Stevenson in contrast is directed to a light emitting diode for emitting violet light. See, for example, column 1, lines 10-12 of Stevenson ("[T]his invention relates generally to light emitting diodes and more particularly a violet light emitting diode"). See also column 1, lines 26-27 of

[1] claims 18-20 having been cancelled herein, rendering the rejection of such claims moot.

Stevenson ("[I]t is a general object of the present invention to provide a violet light emitting diode.")

To achieve such light emitting diode emission, Stevenson teaches a structure including a sapphire substrate having deposited thereon a layer of n-type gallium nitride, on which has been deposited a magnesium-doped gallium nitride layer to compensate the n-type material and form a substantially intrinsic GaN:Mg layer forming an i-n junction with the n-type gallium nitride layer. Leads are connected to the magnesium-doped gallium nitride layer and to the n-type gallium nitride layer, to constitute the structure as shown in FIG. 3 of the patent. The patent discloses that this structure when powered in a forward bias mode will produce violet light, and that under reverse bias conditions, greenish light can be produced (see column 2, lines 55-64 of Stevenson).

Stevenson then goes on to state, in the paragraph bridging columns 3 and 4 of the patent that:

> "Thus, it is seen that there has been provided an improved light emitting diode capable of emitting light in the violet region of the spectrum. This device may be used as a source of violet light for applications where this spectral range is appropriate. This light maybe converted to lower frequencies (lower energy) with good conversion efficiency using organic and inorganic phosphors. Such a conversion is appropriate to develop different colors for aesthetic purposes, but also to produce light in a spectral range of greater sensitivity for the human eye. By use of different phosphors, all the primary colors may be developed from this same basic device. An array of such devices may be used for color display systems: for example, a solid state TV screen."

It therefore is seen that Stevenson describes the use of phosphors for developing "different colors," "light in a spectral range of greater sensitivity for the human eye," "all the primary colors," and TV screen arrays.

It is apparent from the forgoing that Stevenson contemplates distinct colors ("different colors," "primary colors"). The specific example of color display systems for a solid state TV screen, as

including "[A]n array of such devices," therefore relates to provision of red LEDs, green LEDs, and blue LEDs, as utilized in a red-green-blue (RGB) TV screen array. There is no disclosure of emitting radiation "in the visible white light spectrum."

It therefore is apparent that there is no teaching in Stevenson of the applicants' claimed invention as broadly recited in claim 1, and therefore no derivative basis for any of the rejected claims 1-2, 4-9, 11-13 and 25-30, since claims 2, 4-9 and 11-30 are of dependent form under claim 1, and claim 25, from which claims 26-30 depend, recites, *inter alia*, a light emission device emitting a "white light output."

Despite the absence of teaching in Stevenson of production of "radiation in the visible white light spectrum," as recited in broad claim 1, and correspondingly required in claims 2, 4-9 and 11-13 dependent thereunder, or of "white light output" as recited in claim 25 and required by claims 26-30 dependent thereunder, the examiner, while conceding that "the prior art does not specially disclose the 'white light' limitation," has contended that

> "this feature is seen to be inherently teaching of that limitation because visible light would include white light[2]. In addition, phosphor material inherently converts short wavelength light to white light[3], see Seder (5211467) in col. 2, lines 61-65." (footnotes added)

Seder relates to a fluorescent lighting system in which a lamp filled with mercury vapor is arranged for emission of radiation that is impinged on a phosphor-coated diffuser plate or mirror to convert the radiation from the mercury vapor to uniform white light illumination (see Abstract of Seder). The passage referred to by the examiner refers to a non-specified phosphor coating:

> "for greater efficiency, the backside of plate 25 may include a coating 28 that transmits UV radiation to phosphor coating 26 but reflects RGB radiation emitted by the phosphors. As result [sic], plate 25 emits a uniform distribution of white light."

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[2] This assertion that "visible light would include white light" is incorrect. Red light is visible light but does not include white light; green light is visible light but does not include white light.

[3] The broad assertion that phosphor material inherently converts short wavelength light to white light is likewise incorrect; a phosphor may for example convert incident radiation to red light, yellow light, or other light of a single color, depending on its specific composition.

It therefore is evident that the rejection is premised on importing from Seder into Stevenson the concept of non-specified phosphors producing white light.

The knowledge that fluorescent lamps utilize phosphors in coatings to produce white light illumination is acknowledged by applicants in the background section of their application, at page 6, line 16 - page 7, line 15 thereof.

It is pointed out, however, that Stevenson is directed to production of light of specific color ("violet light," "different colors," "primary colors"). In a specific implementation described in Stevenson, an array of specific color LEDs is provided for TV color display systems.

In this respect, it is to be pointed out that Stevenson does not disclose any phosphor other than referring generally to "organic and inorganic phosphors" (column 3, lines 30-31) – there is a general assertion that phosphors are potentially useful ("[T]his light may be converted...using organic and inorganic phosphors"- column 3, lines 28-31 of Stevenson).

Thus, Stevenson contemplates no actual phosphors and is wholly speculative ("may be") on the utility of such usage. Such speculative and non-enabling character of the quoted disclosure is conclusive on the issue of anticipation, since it is elemental law that a non-enabling reference is not competent prior art. *Amgen, Inc. v. Hoescht Marion Roussel, Inc.*, 314 F.3d 1313, 1354, 65 USPQ2d 1385, 1416 (Fed.Cir. 2003).

The foregoing compels the conclusion that there is no derivative basis in the cited Stevenson reference for applicants' claimed invention, under the criteria applicable to inherency-based rejections.

In MPEP §2112 ("Requirements of Rejection Based on Inherency; Burden of Proof"), these criteria for inherency-based rejections are stated:

> "The fact that a certain result or characteristic may occur or be present in the prior art is not sufficient to establish the inherency of that result or characteristic. *In re Rijckaert*, 9 F.3d 1531, 1534, 28 USPQ2d 1955, 1957 (Fed. Cir. 1993). "To establish

> inherency, the extrinsic evidence 'must make clear that the missing descriptive matter is necessarily present in the thing described in the reference, and that it would be so recognized by persons of ordinary skill. Inherency, however, may not be established by probabilities or possibilities. The mere fact that a certain thing may result from a given set of circumstances is not sufficient.' " *In re Robertson*, 169 F.3d 743, 745, 49 USPQ2d 1949, 1950-51 (Fed. Cir. 1999) ... *Metabolite Labs., Inc. v. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings*, 370 F.3d 1354, 1367, 71 USPQ2d 1081, 1091 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (explaining that "[a] prior art reference that discloses a genus still does not inherently disclose all species within that broad category" but must be examined to see if a disclosure of the claimed species has been made or whether the prior art reference merely invites further experimentation to find the species....
>
> "In relying upon the theory of inherency, the examiner must provide a basis in fact and/or technical reasoning to reasonably support the determination that the allegedly inherent characteristic necessarily flows from the teachings of the applied prior art. *Ex parte Levy*, 17 USPQ2d 1461, 1464 (Bd. Pat. App. & Inter. 1990) (emphasis in original)."

Stevenson, therefore, does not teach applicants' claimed invention. Stevenson is devoid of any teaching of a particular phosphor. Since Stevenson's phosphor is unnamed and unspecified, there is no basis for attributing to such phosphor any specific response to incident radiation.

Inherency is utilized as a basis for rejection, to infer that material, structure, etc. in a cited reference will function in a specific manner to provide the attributed result, as a matter of fundamental operation.

Here, there is no basis for importing into the speculative Stevenson teaching (of an unidentified, non-specified phosphor) any particular emissive response. In this respect, it is to be noted that there are large numbers of commercially available phosphors, having widely varied and disparate emissive responses in relation to one another.

There is therefore no basis, other than hindsight reasoning, to attribute to Stevenson a phosphor that would produce white light, particularly since same is in no way suggested by Stevensons' teaching of specific colors (violet, primary colors).

Further, the phosphors used in Seder are phosphors in fluorescent lighting systems. A fluorescent lighting system is a non-solid-state system, and an excited mercury vapor is fundamentally different from and non-analogous to a light emitting diode. Once skilled in the art logically would not look to mercury vapor ionization light source systems for guidance as to solid state microelectronic device implementations.

In sum, there is no basis in the Stevenson/Seder references for the invention as claimed in claims 1-2, 4-9, 11-13 and 25-30.

It therefore is requested that the rejection of claims 1-2, 4-9, 11-13 and 25-30 based on Stevenson/Seder be withdrawn.

The §103 Rejection of Claim 3

Claim 3 has been rejected under §103(a) as unpatentable over Stevenson in view of O'Connor. Such rejection is traversed.

The requirements for §103 rejection of claims are set out in MPEP §2143 ("Basic Requirements of a *Prima Facie* Case of Obviousness"):

> "To establish a *prima facie* case of obviousness, three basic criteria must be met. First, there must be some suggestion or motivation, either in the references themselves or in the knowledge generally available to one of ordinary skill in the art, to modify the reference or to combine reference teachings. Second, there must be a reasonable expectation of success. Finally, the prior art reference (or references when combined) must teach or suggest all the claim limitations.
>
> The teaching or suggestion to make the claimed combination and the reasonable expectation of success must both be found in the prior art, not in applicant's disclosure. *In re Vaeck*, 947 F.2d 488, 20 USPQ2d 1438 (Fed. Cir. 1991)."

Applying such obviousness criteria to claim 3 and the cited reference combination of Stevenson in view of O'Connor, it is to be appreciated that O'Connor teaches away from the present invention, by O'Connors' teaching to utilize up-conversion as a source of emitted light.

Claim 1, from which rejected claim 3 depends, recites *inter alia*, "a down-converting luminophoric medium." A down-converting medium is one that converts a shorter wavelength incident radiation to a longer wavelength emission. This is opposite to an up-converting luminophoric medium, which converts a longer wavelength incident radiation to a shorter wavelength emission.

O'Connor at column 2, lines 5-6 teaches the use of light omitting diodes "such as InGAs diodes or GaAs diodes." Indium gallium arsenide (InGaAs) diodes emit radiation in a wavelength range that is approximately 1200-1550 nanometers, and gallium arsenide (GaAs) diodes provide infrared emission in a wavelength of approximately 850 to 950 nanometers (nm). See, for example, O'Connor at column 2, lines 16-17, referring to a "typical GaAs diode with a center wavelength with approximately 950 nm." See also O'Connor at column 2, lines 44-49, referring to an indium gallium arsenide diode having a center wavelength of "near 1550 nm."

This opposite (to the down-conversion aspect of the present invention) up-conversion approach of O'Connor is further apparent from FIG. 2 and FIG. 3 of the patent, in which FIG. 2 is the bandwidth graph of a solid state optical source. As apparent from the numerical values in the range of from 930-970 nm, the solid state source is in the near infrared spectral regime. FIG. 3 is a bandwidth graph of the solid state source with a phosphor coating, showing a wavelength in a range of approximately 450-850nm, centered at 650nm in the visible spectral regime. Comparison of FIG. 2 and FIG. 3 therefore shows that a longer wavelength radiation has been converted to a shorter wavelength radiation, which is the *sine qua non* of up-conversion. This is opposite to the down-conversion required in applicants' invention, in which a shorter wavelength radiation is converted to a longer wavelength emission.

Accordingly, no basis is apparent for extracting features from O'Connor for incorporation in Stevenson, but even if a housing member were arbitrarily extracted from Stevenson and arbitrarily incorporated in Stevenson, the resulting hypothetical combination would still be deficient in relation to applicants' claimed invention, as lacking ability to "emit radiation in the visible white light spectrum," as required by applicants' claim 1 and claims dependent thereunder, and as lacking ability to produce "a white light output" as recited in claim 25 and claims dependent thereunder.

It is correspondingly requested that the rejection of claim 3 be withdrawn.

The §103 Rejection of Claim 10

Concerning the rejection of claim 10, such rejection is based on a hypothetical replacement of the sapphire substrate of Stevenson with a silicon carbide substrate disclosed by Nakamura, as a "mere substitution of art-recognized equivalent values" (page 6, line 21 of the March 28, 2006 Office Action).

In his statement of rejection, the examiner has referred to column 6, line 2 of Nakamura as the source disclosure for such hypothetical substitution. The full text of the sentence in Nakamura from which this disclosure has been taken, however, more comprehensively states that

> "In the present invention [of Nakamura], the substrate 12 can normally be formed of a material such as sapphire, silicon carbide (SIC), or zinc oxide (Zn)), and is most normally formed of sapphire" (Nakamura, column 6, lines 1-3).

It does not follow from this disclosure in Nakamura that sapphire and silicon carbide are "art-recognized equivalent values."

It is self-evident that sapphire and silicon carbide are different materials, with different lattice constants, and different compositions. Nakamura states at column 6, lines 1-3 that the substrate "is most normally formed of sapphire." By such language, Nakamura expresses a preference for sapphire as the substrate material.

Accordingly, since Nakamura expresses a preference for use of sapphire over SiC, why would one of skill in the art, viewing Nakamura's expressed preference for the use of sapphire, replace Stevenson's expressly taught sapphire substrate with a less preferred substrate material from

Nakamura, particularly when the respective structures in Nakamura and Stevenson are fundamentally different[4] from one another?

The answer is that one viewing both references would logically "keep" the sapphire substrate taught by Stevenson, particularly since sapphire is the preferred substrate material in Nakamura.

Further, even if one were, for the sake of argument, to make the substitution, though as mentioned there is no basis in the reference disclosures for doing so, even then the resulting combination would not equate to the light emitting assembly recited in applicants' claim 10, since Stevenson lacks teaching of any structure capable to "emit radiation in the visible white light spectrum," as recited in claim 1, and correspondingly required in claim 10 by virtue of its dependence from claim 1.

It therefore is respectfully requested that the rejection of claim 10 be withdrawn.

The §103 Rejection of Claims 14-17

Concerning the rejection of claims 14-17 based on Stevenson in view of Nakamura combined with Seybold combined with "Applicant Admitted Prior Art (APA)," the "Applicant Admitted Prior Art (APA)" is referenced at page 8 of the March 28, 2006 Office Action to the following statement by the examiner: "Applicants admit in page 18 that the fluorescent materials claimed in claims 16-17 are commercially available."

The specific passage at page 18 of the present application directed to fluorescent materials is reproduced below for ease of discussion:

> "converting material in this embodiment comprises a blue fluorescer (Lumogen® F Violet 570 - substituted napthalenetetracarboxylic diimide), a green-yellow fluorescer (Lumogen® F Yellow 083 - substituted perylenetetracarboxylic

[4] Nakamura teaches the provision of a buffer layer 14 on the substrate (see FIG. 1 of Nakamura) and discloses that "the buffer layer 14 can be formed of AlN or a gallium nitride-based compound semiconductor" (column 6, lines 5-6). By contrast, there is no "buffer layer" in the structure taught by Stevenson.

> diimide) and a red fluorescer (Lumogen® F Red 300 - substituted perylenetetracarboxylic diimide). A composition comprising such blue, green-yellow, and red fluorescent materials, all organic based, as incorporated in an insulating epoxy polymer, is available commercially from Pacific Polytech (Pacific Polytech, Incorporated, 15 Commercial Blvd., Novato, Calif. 94949-6135)."

The statement of rejection by the examiner at page 8 of the March 28, 2006 Office Action cites MPEP 2144.07 for the proposition that "it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art to use the teaching of Stevenson with the fluorescent materials commercially available as claim [sic] for intended use."

Considering this provision in specific detail, MPEP 2144.07 ("Art Recognized Suitability for an Intended Purpose") states that "selection of a known material based on its suitability for its intended use supported a *prima facie* obviousness determination in *Sinclair & Carroll Co. v. Interchemical Corp.*, 325 U.S. 327, 65 USPQ 297 (1945)."[5]

MPEP 2144.07 is not appropriate authority for the rejection, since the threshold assumption on which the rejection is based is that the referenced Pacific Polytech product was commercially available "for [the] intended use" at the time the present invention was made. Such is not the case – the intended use of luminophoric material in the applicants' claimed invention is to down-convert radiation from a solid-state device to produce visible white light, a use that was wholly unknown until the making of the present invention by applicants.

The mere commercial existence of a material that in accordance with the present invention is put to a new use previously unknown as an application of such material, does not in any way constitute a suggestive basis for applicants' claimed invention, and MPEP 2144.07 does not in any way compel a contrary conclusion.

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[5] This MPEP provision also cites *In re Leshin*, 227 F.2d 197, 125 USPQ 416 (CCPA 1960) (selection of a known plastic to make a container of a type made of plastics prior to the invention was held to be obvious) and *Ryco, Inc. v. Ag-Bag Corp.*, 857 F.2d 1418, 8 USPQ2d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (claimed agricultural bagging machine, which differed from a prior art machine only in that the brake means were hydraulically operated rather than mechanically operated, was held to be obvious over the prior art machine in view of references which disclosed hydraulic brakes for performing the same function, albeit in a different environment.).

The statement of rejection in the March 28, 2006 Office Action also refers to *In re Aller* for the proposition that it would have been obvious to use the teaching of Stevenson with the commercially available fluorescent materials in the range claimed (this has apparent reference to the recitation of mole percent ranges of the diimide materials in claim 17), "because it has been held that where the general conditions of the claims are discloses [sic] in the prior art, it is not inventive to discover the optimum or workable range by routine experimentation" (page 8, lines 6-8 of the March 28, 2006 Office Action).

As has already been stated, the use of these diimide materials in the manner of applicants' invention, as a luminophoric material to down-convert radiation from a solid-state device to produce visible white light, was unknown prior to applicants' invention. Thus, the "general conditions ... [disclosed] in the prior art" that are referred to in the statement of rejection did not include any contemplation of the use of the diimide material as a down-conversion medium receiving radiation from a solid state device to produce visible white light.

Accordingly, claim 17, as well as claims 14-16, patentably distinguish over the art, since the combination of Stevenson, Nakamura, Seybold and the page 18 mention of diimides does not yield applicants' claimed invention.

Stevenson lacks disclosure of emitting radiation "in the visible white light spectrum."

The respective structures in Nakamura and Stevenson are fundamentally different from one another, as noted above. Further, Stevenson teaches a violet light emitting diode ("the violet light is readily seen in a well lit room at 20 volts" – column 2, lines 60-61 of Stevenson), so why would one arbitrarily discard the (visible spectrum) violet light LED of Stevenson and replace it with an (invisible spectrum) ultraviolet energy source of Nakamura, as proposed in the rejection?

The statement at page 7 of the Office Action that "it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art to use ultraviolet light LED the teaching of Nakamura in Stevenson's device for

intended purposed [sic]," does not identify any motivation or basis for the proposed modification.

Accordingly, the requirements for §103 rejection of claims set out in MPEP §2143 ("Basic Requirements of a *Prima Facie* Case of Obviousness") have not been met in the stated basis for combining Stevenson and Nakamura, since as a threshold matter, "there must be some suggestion or motivation, either in the references themselves or in the knowledge generally available to one of ordinary skill in the art, to modify the reference or to combine reference teachings." MPEP §2143. Here, there is no such suggestion or motivation identified in the Office Action, and indeed, none exists.

Seybold has been cited for disclosure of diimide dyes. The statement of rejection at page 7 of the Office Action contends that it would be obvious to use such dyes in the "luminophoric medium layer of Stevenson because it would have improved light-fastness and convert light to fluorescent light with high efficiciency in a broad wavelength range and good thermal stability as taught by Seybold, column 2, lines 42-54."

The foregoing ignores the fact that Seybold teaches that his diimide materials are for use in plastics and polymeric media (see last line of Abstract in Seybold - "are very useful as fluorescent dyes in organic material;" column 1, line 2 of Seybold - "fluorescent dyes incorporated into plastic;" column 1, lines 26-27 of Seybold - "in the polymer matrix;" column 1, line 38 of Seybold - "in plastic sheets or films;" column 2, lines 47-48 of Seybold - "high thermal stability in the polymers conventionally used as media is also noteworthy;" and column 7, lines 21-23 of Seybold - "[T]he novel compounds are used as a rule by incorporating them into plastics suitable for the particular application." By contrast, no plastic media are taught or suggested by Stevenson.

Still further, Seybold teaches that his dyes are used in ambient natural light ("they absorb a very broad range of visible sunlight and emit this as fluorescent light"). In such manner, Seybold teaches away from use of any LED excitation, further underscoring the fact that there is no derivative basis in the references for the applicants' claimed invention.

Based on the foregoing, it is clear that the combination of Stevenson, Nakamura, Seybold and the page 18 mention of diimides, cannot yield applicants' claimed invention, since there is no motivation to combine such teachings in the first instance, for the reasons stated above, and even if the combinations proposed in the Office Action were for the sake of argument to be made, despite the absence of any basis in the references or the art generally for such combination, even then the references would still not combine to yield applicants' claimed invention, since the resultant combination would lack any capability to "emit radiation in the visible white light spectrum" as required by claim 1, from which each of the rejected claims 14-17 depends.

It therefore is respectfully requested that such rejection of claims 14-17 be withdrawn.

Fee Payable for Added Claims 31-41 and Payment by Credit Card

The payment of the fee of $600 for the claims 31-41 added herein, representing a net addition of 1 independent claim, and 8 total claims (in consequence of the cancellation of claims 18-20 herein), is hereby enclosed in the accompanying Credit Card Authorization form.

The USPTO also is hereby authorized to charge any deficiency, or credit any overpayment of fees properly payable for this response, to Deposit Account No. 08-3284.

CONCLUSION

All pending claims 1-17, and 25-41 are now in form and condition for allowance. If there are any issues outstanding, incident to formal allowance of this application, the examiner is requested to contact the undersigned attorney at (919) 419-9350 to discuss their resolution, in order that this application may be passed to issue at an early date.

Respectfully submitted,



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